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1. A SAUSSURIAN INTRODUCTION
One of the most impressive capabilities of the human language user is the ability to access the 
right word at the right moment. In fluent speech words are produced at a rate of about two or 
three per second. That means that, on the average, every 400 milliseconds an item (a word, a 
root) is selected from the speaker's sizable lexicon (which can easily contain 30,000 words, 
dependent on the speaker's language and education). What is a lexical item? What kind of 
internal structure does it have? Let us recall Saussure's analysis of the linguistic sign.
Figure 1. Saussure's egg: the linguistic sign
According to him, it is a two-sided psychological entity, representable as in Figure 1. The 
two elements, concept and sound image, are intimately linked, he says; each recalls the other. 
When we consider lexical access in speech, we might rephrase this as follows: A sound image 
can be recalled through the meeting of its conceptual conditions. This raises some important 
psycholinguistic questions: What is the nature of the conceptual conditions to be fulfilled, and 
by what kind of process is the appropriate lexical item singled out from among its many 
thousands of competitors? That process should meet the real-time requirements mentioned 
above, as well as others that we will return to in the course of this paper. Though these 
questions are crucial ones for a theory of the speaker, it should immediately be added that 
Saussure's picture of the linguistic sign is incomplete. It ignores (at least) a third kind of
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information, the item's syntactic properties, or to stay closer to De Saussure, its syntagmatic 
properties, the ways in which the item can enter into phrasal combinations with other linguistic 
signs. The obvious expansion of the above picture would be Figure 2.
Figure 2. From egg to pie: including the sign's syntagmatic properties
In speaking, certain sound images are retrieved not so much on the basis of conceptual 
conditions as by prevailing syntactic conditions. The accessing of auxiliaries is conditioned in 
this way; it is also the case for idiomatic prepositions, certain articles, and items of minor 
syntactic categories.
An item's syntactic properties always play a crucial role in the sentence generation process. 
They determine the syntactic environments that must be realized if that item is to be used, and 
these in turn impose constraints on the syntactic properties of further items to be retrieved. Or to 
put it differently: where concepts clearly serve as input for lexical access in speech production, 
yielding sound images as output, syntax plays both input and output roles. These input/output 
relations can be depicted as in Figure 3.
SYNTACTIC
lemma
exeme
4
PHONETIC
ENVIRONMENT
Figure 3. The activation of a linguistic sign in language production
It can be read as follows: The lexical item 'resonates' to the current conceptual environment, 
the speaker's speech act intention, message, or whatever it is called. When the item's
CONCEPTUAL
ENVIRONMENT
e n v ir o n m e n t
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conceptual conditions are sufficiently present in that environment, its syntactic properties 
become available for the procedures of sentence generation. The retrieval of other items is 
directly conditioned by the current syntactic environment. Whatever the cause is for an item's 
activation, it eventually leads to the recall of its sound image, to use Saussure's terms. In fact, 
this 'recall' is a highly complex process, involving several steps (see Levelt & Schriefers, 
forthcoming). Before we leave this Saussurian introduction, it should be noticed that the 
generation of syntactic surface form may exclusively hinge on the conceptual/syntactic 
properties of lexical items. There is, indeed, psychological evidence for the assumption that a 
speaker's construction of surface form is relatively independent of the accessibility of the sound 
images of the words involved. (That there can be some dependence has been argued by Levelt
& Maassen, 1981, Dell, 1986 and Bock, forthcoming.) This has led various authors (Garrett, 
1980; Kempen & Huijbers, 1983; Levelt & Maassen, 1981; Levelt, 1983) to suppose that 
lexical access in fluent speech is a two-stage process: In a first stage the conceptual/syntactic 
properties of a lexical item are activated and used for the generation of syntactic surface form; in 
a second phase the item's sound form properties are retrieved and made available for the 
generation of a phonetic plan. Kempen & Huijbers proposed calling the lexical information 
which is active in the first phase, i.e. the conceptual and syntactic pieces of the Saussurian pie, 
lemma, and the sound form information retrieved in the second phase lexeme. These terms have 
been inserted in Figure 3. It should, however, immediately be added that this two-stage notion 
of lexical access is an assumption in need of empirical verification. It is not entailed by the 
observation that the generation of syntax is highly independent of the sound form properties of 
its constituent lexical items.
2. STAGES, MODULES, AND PARALLEL PROCESSING
The potential stages of lemma and lexeme access are necessarily preceded and followed by 
additional processing stages. A preliminary step to lexical access is, of course, to create the 
conceptual environment which includes the conceptual conditions for the activation of the lexical 
item.
This stage is followed by lexical access proper: the activation of lemma and lexeme, either in 
two successive stages or simultaneously. This leaves us with the 'sound image', the basis for 
the construction of a phonetic or articulatory program. To execute this articulatory program, i.e. 
to utter the lexical item, the articulatory machinery must unpack and execute the program. This 
is the articulatory stage.
These four stages in the generation of a lexical item relate to four processing modules 
involved in the generation of speech: The first one, the conceptualizer, maps a communicative 
intention onto a preverbal message. The second, the grammatical encoder, takes a message as 
input and produces a surface structure as output. The third module, the sound form encoder, 
maps the surface structure onto a phonetic or articulatory plan. The fourth one, finally, the 
articulator, interprets and executes the phonetic plan for an utterance as an articulatory motor 
program. This is depicted in Table 1.
Before turning to lexical access proper, we should say a few words about these processing 
modules. The conceptualizer  is the rather open set of mental procedures involved in the 
planning of speech acts, in message encoding. This planning is an intentional non-automatic 
activity, which relies heavily on the speaker's attentional resources. Message encoding begins 
with the speaker's conception of some communicative intention, some goal to be achieved by 
speech. It may, for instance, be the speaker's goal to let the interlocutor know his intention to 
have her believe that P .1 The speaker will then find a speech act which will have the intended 
effect. In the example case, a good choice will be: Declare P (see Appelt, 1985 for a detailed
analysis of these issues).
But P can be declared in different ways. If P is that X has a dog, where X is a particular 
friend of the speaker, he may refer to X by using his name {Harry), by mentioning their mutual 
relation (my friend), by anaphoric reference (he), or otherwise. These choices depend on the
1 In the present paper the current speaker and addressee are taken to be male and female, respectively.
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I
discourse situation, the mutual knowledge of the interlocutors, and so forth. Also, the 
possession relation may take different shades, which will eventually surface as, for instance, 
have or own or possess. This, again, depends on subtle features of the discourse context, the 
formality of the interaction, etc. The final result of specifying the speech act in all this precious 
conceptual detail we call the preverbal message', it includes the conceptual conditions for the 
activation of one or more lexical items.
Table 1. Processing modules in speech generation and their relation to phases of lexical access.
PROCESSOR INPUT OUTPUT RELATION TO LEXICAL ACCESS
1. Conceptualizer communicative
intention
preverbal
message
creating a lexical item's 
conceptual conditions
2. Grammatical 
encoder
preverbal
message
surface
structure
retrieval of the lemma, i.e. 
making the item's syntactic 
properties available, given 
appropriate conceptual or 
syntactic conditions.
3. Sound form 
encoder
surface
structure
phonetic 
or articu­
latory plan 
for the 
utterance 
•
retrieval of the lexeme, i.e. 
the item's stored sound form 
specifications, and its 
phonological integration in 
the articulatory plan.
4. Articulator phonetic
plan
overt
speech
executing the item's context- 
dependent articulatory program
This preverbal message is the input to the grammatical encoder. Grammatical encoding is 
lexically driven in that the conceptually activated items specify how conceptual relations are to 
be mapped onto grammatical relations. The lemmas for verbs, in particular, require the 
realization of specific grammatical relations for their conceptual arguments (or theta-roles). The 
syntactic categories of the lemmas trigger the grammatical encoder to build phrases that can be 
headed by that category: VPs for verbs, NPs for nouns, and so forth. This phrase-building 
involves the assignment of order over the consdtuents involved, and the attachment of phrases 
to higher level nodes. Kempen & Hoenkamp (in press) have proposed an artificial encoding 
system which involves these features and which has the additional psychological attraction of 
being able to generate surface structures incrementally from left to right. The grammatical 
encoder also assigns focus to particular elements in surface structure. This originates in 
conceptual focussing, but is further shaped by phrase-constructional processes.
The sound form encoder takes successive fragments of surface structure, as they become 
available, as input and produces a phonetic representation which the articulator will have to 
interpret as a speech motor program. Sound form encoding is, again, lexically driven. The 
metrical and segmental form specifications stored with each lexical item (i.e. its lexeme) are 
made available; they impose rhythmic and coarticulatory restrictions on the item's environment. 
The sound form encoder builds phonological phrases around focussed elements, which are 
given pitch accent. An element's free sound form parameters, such as metrical stress, syllable 
length, vowel quality (reduced/ non-reduced), and pitch movement are adapted to conditions 
prevailing in the phonological phrase. Still, the resulting phonetic representation for an utterance 
is probably quite context-free as far as the articulatory motor context is concerned; the
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representation is probably not different for situations where the speaker has or does not have a 
pipe in his mouth, has or does not have a cold, etc.
It is precisely the task of the articulatory system to translate the phonetic plan in a sequence 
of context-sensitive articulatory gestures. The articulatory goals laid down in the phonetic plan 
can, within limits, be reached in a variety of ways. Groups of muscles form so-called 
synergisms  or coordinative structures  which function as units to reach a certain goal, 
compensating for prevailing contextual conditions. This involves no effort or attention on the 
part of the speaker; it is rather the wisdom of the body.
Since, after message encoding, each module operates on the output of the previous one, it is 
reasonable to ask how the previously mentioned speed of lexical processing, some two or three 
words per second, can be attained when so many stages have to be chained. Can one run 
through all these processing steps in less than some 400 milliseconds? The answer is 'no'. Still, 
a high speed in speaking can be attained by what Kempen & Hoenkamp (in press) call 
incremental production . The modules operate in parallel and deliver their characteristic output in 
small chunks 'from left to right'. Once a module has delivered an element, it is immediately 
picked up and processed by the next module, for which it is characteristic input, and so forth. 
This puts substantial constraints on the modules' processing. If there were a lot of 
backtracking, such a system could not function; speech would be dysfluent, with frequent 
restarts and long lapses. Incremental processing is both serial and parallel processing. The 
parallelness of the modules' functioning is essential for the maintenance of a high speaking rate 
and fluency. Seriality does imply relatively long 'front-to-end' processing durations. The latter 
is especially apparent in tasks, such as object naming, which involve single-word responses. 
These consist almost entirely of lexical processing. From the presentation of a familiar object, 
such as a table, to the end of the naming response involves, on the average, one and a half 
seconds. Of this, only about 300 to 400 milliseconds are used to recognize the object, i.e. for 
visual processing; all of the rest of the time is spent on lexical access and articulation.
We will now turn to a discussion of some recent experimental results which, we believe, 
support and further qualify the framework just sketched. The first set of experiments was 
designed, among other things, to localize in this processing framework some peculiar accessing 
effects which were observed in the use of semantically marked versus unmarked comparatives. 
The second set addresses the issue, raised above, of whether lemma and sound form (lexeme) 
information are successively or simultaneously retrieved during lexical access. The final section 
of this chapter will return to the important theoretical issue of how a lexical item 'recognizes' its 
conditions of use in the conceptual environment.
3. LOCALIZING ACCESS EFFECTS: THE CASE OF SEMANTIC MARKEDNESS
In a recent series of experiments (Schriefers, 1985) it was discovered that, in making 
comparative judgments, speakers take more time to generate a semantically marked adjective 
than a semantically unmarked one. The effect arises, for instance, in an experimental task where 
the subject is presented with a pair of objects which differ only in size (cf. Figure 4).
Figure 4. Example of stimuli used in a relation-naming experiment
After 1.5 seconds a corss appears near one of the two objects, and the subject is to say 
whether that object is the bigger or the smaller one of the two. We measured the time from the 
appearance of the cross to the speaker's speech onset. It took about 40 milliseconds longer to 
initiate the response 'smaller' than the response 'bigger'. The same markedness effect was
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found for situations where the judgment was 'longer' versus 'shorter*. These effects were 
statistically highly significant.
Which accessing stage is responsible for this difference? A first possibility is that the effect 
is due to conceptual decisions, i.e.decisions made in the message-encoding stage. One might 
well argue that it is easier to judge that an object is bigger or longer than to judge that it is 
smaller or shorter, people may have judgmental biases of this sort. If this is so, the markedness 
effect should also arise in a nonverbal judgment task, i.e. in a task where the subject does not 
give a verbal response but rather pushes one button when the indicated object is bigger and 
another button when the object is smaller. This experiment was done, and the results were 
unequivocal: The markedness effect disappeared completely. This shows that the effect is not 
due to conceptual decision making. The effect can only be obtained if the response is verbal. In 
other words, the effect must reside in either the lexical-access phases or in the final articulatory 
phase.
Is the effect articulatory? Is it harder to initiate the speech motor program for a semantically 
marked item than for an unmarked one? To test this possibility, an experiment was done where 
the speaker was presented with the printed words bigger or smaller (or with the words longer or 
shorter). In half of the trials the word was, after 1 second, followed by a cross. This was the 
signal for the subject to pronounce the word. Again, speech onset latencies were measured. In 
this task, the subject could prepare the verbal response and release it as soon as the cross 
appeared. Would response initiation take more time for smaller and shorter than for bigger and 
longer? It did not. There was no statistical difference between speech onset latencies for marked 
and unmarked items. That means that the markedness effect cannot be located in the final 
articulatory stage.
By exclusion, the markedness effect must be due to lexical access proper, the retrieval of the 
lexical item from the mental lexicon. We do not know what is so hard to retrieve for a marked 
element, the lemma information or the lexeme information or both. Is it the case that a 
semantically marked lexical item requires more time for the recognition of the satisfaction of its 
conceptual conditions than does a semantically unmarked item? Or is the effect rather due to 
sound form access? The more general issue is whether these are indeed distinguishable 
successive phases. We will return to this in the next section.
The present series of experiments also showed the existence of a so-called congruency 
effect. The effect is the following: When the two figures to be compared in the comparative 
judgment task were both relatively large (or relatively long), this facilitated the bigger (longer) 
response, and interfered with the smaller (shorter) response. If, however, both figures were 
relatively small (or short), the smaller (shorter) response was facilitated at the expense of the 
bigger (longer) response. In other words, naming a relation which was congruent with the 
absolute size of the two figures in the picture involved shorter speech onset latencies (by about 
70 milliseconds) than did incongruent reactions. Congruency and markedness effects were, 
moreover, fully additive.
This congruency effect could also be located with respect to processing stage. In order to 
test whether it is preverbal in nature, i.e. originates in the conceptual decision making which 
precedes lexical access, the experiment was repeated with nonverbal responses; the subject had 
to push a 'longer' or a 'shorter' button to express the comparative judgment. The results of this 
nonverbal task were, again, unequivocal: The congruency effect reappeared in undiminished 
fashion. What disappeared was the additive markedness component, and this was to be 
expected given the above-mentioned results with the pushbutton task. Unlike the markedness 
effect, the congruency effect also arises in the situation with the nonverbal response mode, 
which shows that it must be due to difficulties in the subjects' comparative decision making. In 
other words, it arises during the conceptualization stage.
What are the difficulties? Apparently, the subject in this task not only generates a 
comparative judgment, involving the concept BIGGER or SMALLER , but he cannot fully 
suppress the generation of another judgment, an absolute judgment, as well: It is a pair of BIG 
figures, or a pair of SMALL figures. It is easier to generate the BIGGER judgment in the 
presence of the concept BIG than it is in the presence of the concept SMALL, and inversely for 
the SMALLER judgment. This interference is very much like the one obtained in so-called 
'Stroop tasks', such as reading the word green when it is printed in red letters. The source of
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interference is also apparent from the occasional speech errors subjects make: The inappropriate 
response (i.e. smaller for bigger or inversely) is made almost exclusively when the comparative 
size relation is incongruent with absolute size. Many real-life speech errors, in particular the 
Freudian ones, are no doubt due to a similar competition between concepts.
4. ARE LEMMA AND SOUND FORM ACCESS TWO SUCCESSIVE STAGES?
Though there is independent empirical evidence (especially from the analysis of speech errors) 
for the assumption that the grammatical encoding module and the sound form encoding module 
function in relative independence and are serially ordered, this does not imply that lexical access 
also proceeds in two phases, one for lemma retrieval and one for lexeme or sound form 
retrieval. An alternative view could be that an item's lemma and sound form information are 
always simultaneously retrieved when the conceptual and/or syntactic conditions are fulfilled; 
the two kinds of information are only employed by different modules, and therefore in different 
stages of the speech generating process.
We have tried to test these alternative views in a series of experiments. These studies will be 
reported elsewhere, but the basic idea is this: If the lemma and sound form are retrieved in 
subsequent phases, one should be able to find a moment in time during lexical access at which 
there is measurable semantic activation but no phonological activation. In addition, a strong 
version of this view would imply that there is a later phase where there is only phonological 
activation, but no semantic activation. In the experiments, the subjects performed an object 
naming task. They saw a series of slides, each depicting an object, and were asked to name 
each object. When they saw a table, they had to say table; we will call this the 'target word'. In 
one-third of the cases the subjects also performed a secondary task. Shortly after presentation of 
the slide, but before the naming response, the subject heard an acoustic stimulus. This was 
either a word or a nonword. The subject's task was, apart from naming the displayed object as 
always, to push a 'yes' button when the stimulus was a word, and a 'no' button when it was a 
nonword. The subject was instructed to give priority to the lexical decision response over the 
naming response. A little training was enough for most subjects to learn to do this. Only the 
'yes' responses were relevant for the experimental purposes; the corresponding stimulus word 
we will call the test word.
The test word could stand in various relations to the target word. It could, first, be 
semantically related to it; for example, when the target word was table, the test word would be 
chair. It could also be phonologically related to the target word, as would be the case with tailor 
as the test word. As a control, there were also unrelated test words; chicken would be such a 
case. Finally, the identical word (i.e. table when the target word was table) could appear as test 
word. If there are two successive phases in accessing the target word, a semantic and a 
phonological one, one would expect to find an early moment in time, i.e. very soon after 
presentation of the slide, where lexical decision times for the semantically related test word 
would be affected, but where there would be no effect for the phonologically related test word. 
Also, it would be pleasant to find a late moment, i.e. just before the naming response, where 
the response to the phonologically related test word would show an effect, but the response to 
the semantically related one would not.
We did obtain the latter result: There is clearly a moment in time in the preparation of a 
naming response where the item's sound form representation is in an active state but where its 
semantic representation is inactive. However, we were not able to obtain the inverse effect. 
When we presented our test words right after the slide (70 milliseconds after the onset of the 
slide, on the average), we did find the expected effect of semantic activation, but there was 
always also evidence for phonological activation: The lexical decision times for both the 
semantically and phonologically related test word were significantly delayed in this early phase 
of lexical access.
The tentative conclusion from these experiments is that lemma and lexeme information are 
simultaneously accessed, i.e. not in two successive phases. An item's conceptual information, 
however, may be subject to faster decay than its sound form information. The longer
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availability of the sound form information is functional, given its role in the later processing 
stages.
5. HOW DOES A LEXICAL ITEM CHECK THE SATISFACTION OF ITS CONCEPTUAL
CONDITIONS?
Psycholinguists have devoted surprisingly little attention to a fundamental problem of lexical 
access in production, namely, how the lexical item is retrieved, or becomes activated, when its 
conceptual conditions are satisfied. In Artificial Intelligence, Goldman (1975) was the first to 
propose a solution to this problem in the framework of a Schankian Conceptual Dependency 
system. Goldman introduced discrimination nets to mediate between a conceptualization 
(message) and a lexical response. In essence, his discrimination nets are binary tree structures. 
Each nonterminal node in the tree represents some predicate which is either true or false for the 
conceptualization at hand. Terminal nodes correspond to lexical items. The access procedure 
starts by running the test for the tree's root predicate. If it yields the value true for the 
conceptualization at hand, control moves to the node's right-hand daughter; if it is false , it goes 
to the left-hand daughter node. The next test concerns the daughter node's predicate. The 
procedure is self-terminating; it iterates until a terminal node is reached. The lexical item at that 
terminal node is the system's lexical response to the concept. With these means, which were 
enriched and qualified in several ways, Goldman could build a working model for generating 
paraphrases in a limited conceptual domain. No claims were made with respect to linguistic or 
psychological adequacy of the model.
But using the discrimination net approach as a psycholinguistic model probably leads to 
insurmountable problems. In order to find a lexical item in, say, a 30,000 word lexicon, 
between 15 and 15001 binary tests are necessary to reach a lexical item, on the average. The 
serial arrangement of these tests leads to unrealistic real-time properties. This argument is 
strengthened by another unrealistic consequence. Conceptually more complex items will take 
longer to retrieve than less complex ones, because they involve a larger number of successive 
tests. There is, however, no evidence that access to semantically more complex words 
systematically takes longer than access to less complex ones. Though the above results on 
semantic markedness seem to be in support of such a view, there is as much evidence for the 
opposite position: Levelt, Schreuder & Hoenkamp (1978) and Schreuder (1978) found that 
more complex verbs take systematically less time to access than less complex ones do. They 
related this finding to the greater specificity of the complex verbs. We will return to this notion 
shortly.
An additional problem with discrimination nets is that there are large parts of the lexicon 
which do not seem to be hierarchically organized; there are cross-classifications, circular 
arrangements, and so forth (cf. Miller & John son-Laird, 1976). Finally, hypemymy creates 
serious problems. When the conditions for dog are met, those for animal are also met, because 
the dog predicates imply the animal predicates. But then, how can a discrimination net have a 
terminal node for dog when it has one for animall When the concept is that of a dog, testing 
will necessarily be terminated at animal; its hyponyms cannot be represented on the same tree. 
This would predict that we speak in hypemyms only, or alternatively that there are no 
hypemym relations in a lexicon.
Alternative accessing mechanisms have been proposed by Miller & Johnson-Laird (1976). 
They arranged conceptual components (predicates, semantic tests) and lexical items in so-called 
decision tables. Allowing for parallel execution of all tests, high-speed access can be achieved: 
The (first) lexical item whose characteristic column pattern of true, false, and not applicable 
evaluations is matched will be the one accessed. Elsewhere (Levelt & Schriefers, forthcoming) 
we have discussed some of the problems with this approach. One major obstacle resides again 
in the case of hypemymy. If an item's column is matched by the test outcomes, the columns for 
all of its hypemyms will also be matched. Matching the hypemym will, moreover, never be 
slower than matching the target item, but potentially faster. (The slowest test sets the pace in a 
parallel system.) Hence, though hyponyms are representable in this model, hypemym reactions 
will be preferred.
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Though we are not able to present an alternative model at this point, we wish to sketch one 
step towards solving the hypemym problem. For each (open class) lexical item, we propose 
that it contains a unique conceptual condition. We have termed this the item's core sense. There 
are reasonably reliable empirical procedures for determining this semantic core. One is Miller's 
(1969) negation test (for various applications see Noordman, 1979; Levelt, Schreuder & 
Hoenkamp, 1978; Schreuder, 1978). Negating the item affects its core sense only. When asked 
to complete the sentence 'They do not walk, but they...', most subjects react with 'run’. This 
leaves the sense of locomotion, which is shared between walk and run, unaffected. But the 
specific manner of locomotion which is uniquely characteristic of walking is given up. Given 
this notion of core sense, one may conjecture that the following access principle holds:
A lexical item is retrieved if and only if its core conditions are fulfilled 
by the concept to be expressed.
Since these core conditions are unique to the lexical item, their satisfaction in the concept to be 
expressed guarantees the item's retrieval. This is a first step towards solving the problems with 
hypemyms discussed above. But what about the hypemym's core conditions? Lit us compare 
eat and devour, where the former is a hypemym of the latter. According to the accessing 
principle, a speaker will retrieve devour if its core condition, something like the voracious 
manner of eating, is satisfied. But, since devouring implies eating, isn't the core condition for 
eat always simultaneously satisfied when the conceptual conditions for devour are satisfied? If 
so, eat should also be retrieved. There is a way out of this dilemma. It is to invoke an 
additional principle of specificity. Accessing would then be governed by the following dual 
principle:
(a) A lexical item is retrieved only if its core conditions are fulfilled by 
the concept to be expressed.
(b) Of all items whose core conditions are satisfied by the concept, the 
most specific one is retrieved.
The addition of the latter principle prevents eat from becoming activated when the core 
condition for devour is satisfied. It is reminiscent of Grice's maxim of quantity. It is not 
immediately obvious what kind of processing mechanism would realize this specificity 
principle, but this does not appear to be an insoluble problem.
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